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Abstract
This study investigates whether working time accounts affect the performance of
German establishments based on the Establishment Panel from the Institute for
Employment Research. The major results are: productivity and investments are
positively correlated with working time accounts. No significant effects of working
time accounts can be detected on wages and on operating surplus. On average, we
find a tendency towards negative effects on profits. This result is less likely in phases
of low product demand and for export-oriented, large establishments with a high
share of skilled workers. Under strong sales fluctuations, we find positively significant
effects on the operating surplus.
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1 Introduction
The discussion of flexible working time has a long tradition in the economic, psycho-
logical and sociological literature (Berg et al. 2004; Crompton 2002; Dex and Scheibl
2001; Houseman 2001; Kelliher and Anderson 2010; Orpen 1981; Schein et al. 1977).
Working time accounts (WTA) are a specific instrument to allow some working time
flexibility around a planned working time framework and have existed in German
plants since the 1960s. The flexible working hours (Gleitzeit) discussion combined with
the decoupling of working hours and company operating hours has promoted the
breakthrough of WTA (Groß et al. 2000). In recent years, an increasing number of es-
tablishments have implemented WTA. Over the course of the flexibility debate, labor
market reforms and the Great Recession, this instrument has become more popular.
Both employers and employees can benefit from WTA (Seifert 2004): employers are
interested in the ability to adjust employees’ daily or weekly working time if the demand
for and availability of personnel vary over time. They are able to adapt the working vol-
ume without layoff and (re-)hiring personnel. Thus, employers can avoid layoff and re-
cruitment costs. Employees, and especially women, can better combine paid work with
care of children and elderly persons because care cannot be fully pre-planned. Employees
are able to reconcile their work-life balance. The positive and negative effects of flexible
working time on employees also affect firm’s profits. If employers are able to improve the
working conditions of their employees, they can fill vacant positions more quickly and at
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a lower cost. Establishments have possibilities to weaken negative and strengthen positive
effects. Better capacity utilization can be achieved by WTA insofar as capital costs can be
saved and storage costs can be reduced. A more efficient utilization of labor is a central
objective of WTA (Zapf 2012). Employers are better able to meet demand fluctuations
and can better avoid the wage costs associated with workforce under-utilization.
Negative effects of WTA are to be expected if employees use this flexible working
time instrument at different times than the employer desires. Firms would like for
working time hours to be reduced during a recession. If demand for products increases,
they want to expand the scope of work. Overtime hours and therefore positive working
time credits are desired. However, workers want to adjust their working hours to their
preferred timing, namely, according to their preferred leisure and work trade-off. This
means, one perspective might be that the flexible use of WTA by employees in times of
high demand may affect profits negatively. And an alternative view states that the flex-
ible use of WTA by employers in times of low demand may save costs and affect output
positively.
As it is noted that WTA can be in the interest of both employees and employers, the
best way to analyze the effects of WTA would be to use integrated establishment and
individual data. This type of data is available by LIAB – Linked Employer-Employee
Data from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency (BA). However, information on employees’ behavior with respect to WTA is
missing in this data set. Currently, a separate analysis based on establishment and individ-
ual data is only possible. Most existing studies concentrate on the latter issue. Therefore,
our contribution is focused on the establishments’ perspective.
We contribute to the WTA literature by providing a more detailed analysis of work-
ing time accounts with respect to firm effects. First, we discuss the impact of WTA on
productivity not only during the Great Recession but also over a period of six years, in-
cluding the recession period. This enables permanent effects to be detected. Second,
we supplement the investigation of WTA effects on further important business indica-
tors, especially with respect to the wages per employee, investments and profits. This
provides us with insights about the question of whether WTA have positive effects on
firm performance. Third, we investigate whether interaction effects of WTA with other
influencing factors can be uncovered. Among others, we can indirectly show whether
our results are in accordance with the two mentioned hypotheses. Fourth, a subgroup
analysis is carried out. We show that the effects differ between establishments with a
high share and a low share of skilled workers, between companies with strong and only
weak sales fluctuations. Moreover, we present the effects of WTA under different
agreements on the compensation period of time credits and debits within WTA re-
gimes. This reveals whether the WTA effects are heterogeneous with respect to specific
WTA contracts.
Besides graphs and t-tests that reveal the development of the share of WTA and
demonstrate in which characteristics WTA and non-WTA firms differ, we apply econo-
metric methods. The least angle regression approach serves as the basis of variable se-
lection. OLS estimates as benchmarks are supplemented by two-stage least squares for
panel data. Our major results are as follows: productivity and investments are enhanced
by WTA. No influence can be discovered on wages per employee and operating sur-
plus. The latter result is not maintained in establishments under strong sales variation.
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In this case, significantly positive effects on operating surplus are observed. In general,
profits are negatively influenced by WTA. This outcome is less likely for firms with a
high share of qualified workers. In times of low demand during the Great Recession,
WTA help to reduce profit losses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the major empirical results
in the related literature are presented in a brief overview. Section 3 is focused on the
data set and descriptive statistics. In section 4, the applied methods and the economet-
ric results are discussed. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related empirical literature
Various studies exist on flexible working hours in Europe (Chung and Tijdens 2009;
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2012a,
2012b; Platenga and Remery 2010). Chung and Tijdens (2009) present the working time
arrangements in 21 EU member states based on the Establishment Survey on Working
Time 2004/2005.
More detailed information on the use of WTA and their determinants is available
from Germany (Bellmann and Gewiese 2004; Herzog-Stein and Zapf 2014; Lott 2013;
Ludewig 2001; Wotschack and Hildebrandt 2007; Zapf 2012; Zickert 2007). Based on
the IAB Establishment Panel, Bellmann et al. (2012) show that the proportion of WTA
establishments increased slightly between 2002 and 2008. The IAB Working Time Cal-
culation shows strongly varying WTA balances within the period 1991–2010, with a
dramatic slump in 2008/2009 and complete recovery in the following year (Zapf 2012,
p.48). During the crisis, employees’ working time credits were eliminated. However, no
significantly different use of WTA is reported during the crisis compared with other
years. Herzog-Stein and Zapf (2014) stress that WTA played an important role in over-
coming the negative effects of the Great Recession in Germany. Zapf and Brehmer
(2010) argue that the WTA were successful. Their major argument is that companies
with WTA have more quickly matched their working time with product demand during
and after the Great Recession through the reduction of time credits within WTA ar-
rangements than other firms.
The use of long-term WTA depends on firm size, the share of female employees and
the existence of works councils (Wotschack and Hildebrandt 2007). Large firms per-
ceive advantages in support of early retirement options. Small firms with a high share
of female employees emphasize that the use of long-term WTA helps by providing op-
tions for family leaves or temporary part-time schedules.
No detailed information exists on the specific WTA arrangement except in case stud-
ies, e.g., in Lindecke (2008). However, in the latter case, no generalized statements on
the effects of WTA are possible. Empirical investigations on WTA with large individual
datasets solve this problem. This does not meet our main research interest because we
want to analyze the effects on establishments. Nevertheless, the results can demon-
strate in which way individuals are affected by WTA. This can reveal, in comparison
with establishment analyses, whether firms and employees want to build time credits at
the same time and to remove them during the same period. If not, conflicts are
possible.
Further insights into effects of flexible working hours on employees are provided by
Possenriede (2014) using Dutch household panel data from 2002 to 2010. He finds that
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the moderate use of flexi-time does not affect employer-paid training and promotions,
except for female workers. Their chances of a promotion decrease if they make use of
flexi-time. Frequent use of flexible arrangements by employees is sanctioned by the em-
ployer. In that regard, we do not know so much about the objectives of establishments
in relation to flexi-time and WTA. Of more interest for the employer is the result that
flexi-time is negatively associated with sickness absenteeism, especially with the dur-
ation of absence. The effects on the number of working hours are only moderate and,
in many cases, ambiguous. Observed increases are driven by more unpaid overtime
hours.
A specific kind of flexible working time is analyzed by Beckmann et al. (2015). Based
on the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2003 to 2011, they investigate the impact
of self-managed working time on employee effort: 13.9 to 15.0 percent of the employees
could determine their working time in this period at their own discretion. The study
finds higher effort of workers with self-managed working time in comparison to workers
with fixed working hours. This means employers can benefit. However, when the investi-
gation controls for observed and unobserved characteristics and endogeneity, this positive
effect is only moderate, mainly driven by strong work ethic and intrinsic motivation but
not by extrinsic motivators. Increased effort cannot be explained by the theory of reci-
procity. Employees’ shirking as a reaction to self-managed working time is ruled out by
this investigation.
Empirical investigations on WTA effects based on IAB Establishment Panel data are
carried out by Bellmann and Gerner (2011); Gerner (2012) and Balleer et al. (2014).
These studies are focused on the influence of WTA on economic establishment indi-
cators during the Great Recession. WTA play only a moderate role in employment
(Bellmann and Gerner 2011). Using descriptive statistics and multivariate estimates,
Gerner (2012) finds that during the crisis, establishments were strongly hit by reduced
employment, but this decline was smaller than their decrease in sales. The bivariate
analysis supports the hypothesis that WTA contribute to a weaker reduction of em-
ployment. Firms hoarded employees, resulting in lower productivity. A multivariate
investigation cannot detect significant differences in the change in labor productivity
between WTA and non-WTA firms. This could mean that WTA do not achieve the
major objective, namely, the stabilization of employment.
Balleer et al. (2014) confirm these doubts. WTA were not the major driver of the
stable employment level in Germany during the Great Recession. They find that the
separation and hiring reactions to profit changes are similar in firms with and without
WTA. The only significant effect of WTA is revealed by their effect on short-time work.
If revenue expectations increase, the reduction in the number of short-time workers is
larger in firms with WTA.
In sum, the empirical results produced to date cannot ultimately make clear whether
WTA are generally beneficial for establishments. On the one hand, the adoption and
use of WTA have intensified in Europe, especially in Germany. This speaks in favor of
a successful instrument. On the other hand, during the Great Recession, WTA were
less successful in employment stabilization than expected. Based on theoretical con-
siderations, Launov and Wälde (2014) are skeptical because the effect on unemployment
depends on the dynamics of the goods market and the particular productivity type
of a firm.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this study come from the German IAB Establishment Panel (Fischer
et al. 2009). The panel began in 1993 with an annual survey of West German establish-
ments and was extended to East Germany in 1996. The sample selection is representative
of German states (Bundesländer), industries, and establishment size; 16,000 firms are
questioned annually about a wide range of labor market topics. The interviews are
conducted face-to-face by professional interviewers. This ensures a high data quality
and a response rate of 83 percent on average.
The establishments surveyed employ one or more employees covered by social insur-
ance. We use the surveys from 2008 to 2014. In practice, only variables from 2008 until
2013 are considered because some key information collected in year t pertains to the
past year. In this period, information on working time accounts is available for every
year. Positive time credits of WTA are interpreted as overtime work. We know whether
an establishment has WTA, measured as a dummy variable (WTA = 1 if working time
accounts exist; WTA = 0 otherwise). A data problem arises related to WTA in the IAB
Establishment Panel. The filtering procedure in the questionnaire differs in even and
odd years. In even years, firms without overtime work are excluded when asked
whether WTA exist. In odd years, they are included. This means the number of firms
with WTA is lower in even years. Artificial cycles are induced. In order to clear up this
incompatibility, we changed the WTA status in any year (t) if in the year before (t-1)
and after (t + 1) the statements differ, e.g., if we have observed WTA = 0 in 2012 but
WTA = 1 in 2011 and 2013. Then, we assume that WTA = 1 in 2012 would be an-
swered if the filter in 2012 would be the same as in 2011 and 2013. This adjustment is
based on the guess that the abolishment of WTA does not follow in the next year, dir-
ectly after the introduction of WTA. Costs of the introduction usually hinder such a
mechanism. The development of WTA is presented in Fig. 1.
Table 1 displays the statistically significant differences in firm characteristics between
WTA and non-WTA firms based on pooled data from the period 2008–2013. We find
that productivity is higher in firms with WTA. Relatively speaking, WTA help firms to
produce more efficiently. Furthermore, we find that WTA in Germany are more likely
to occur in larger firms than in smaller ones. This finding can also explain that, on
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Fig. 1 Working time accounts in Germany. Shares based on average values per year. Source: IAB Establishment
Panel 2008–2013
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average, WTA firms have greater total sales and investments than other establishments.
Finally, it should be mentioned that WTA firms have more graduates and skilled
workers. This table reveals that poor profits are less widespread in WTA firms than in
non-WTA firms.
Figure 2 displays the development of labor productivity (sales per employee) in WTA
and non-WTA firms. Over the complete period, the productivity of WTA firms is sig-
nificantly higher than in other firms. The figure reveals stronger productivity fluctuations
for non-WTA firms. This supports the notion that WTA contribute to stabilization.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of establishment characteristics, split by WTA and non-WTA firms and
pooled over 2008–2013, t tests of the difference between means of the two types of firms
WTA = 1 WTA = 0 t-test
mean sd mean sd t value
log(PRODUCTIVITY) 11.600 (0.93) 11.215 (0.96) 76.42***
log(WAGES per EMPLOYEE) 7.599 (0.50) 7.189 (0.66) 150.54***
log(FIRM SIZE) 3.908 (1.66) 2.500 (1.40) 183.04***
log(INVESTMENTS) 12.181 (2.39) 10.645 (2.05) 148.10***
log(GRADUATES) 1.534 (1.83) 0.520 (1.13) 159.35***
log(SKILLED WORKERS) 3.333 (1.75) 1.823 (1.47) 184.34***
log(OPERATING SURPLUS) 14.477 (1.99) 12.856 (1.71) 160.05***
PROFITS 3.302 (1.02) 3.183 (1.00) 23.72***
LABOR HOARDING 0.454 (0.50) 0.530 (0.50) −34.04***
PART-TIME WORK 0.851 (0.36) 0.769 (0.42) 46.83***
TEMPORARY WORK 0.207 (0.41) 0.055 (0.23) 99.61***
EXTRA PAYMENTS 0.206 (0.40) 0.108 (0.31) 59.24***
REORGANIZATION 0.026 (0.16) 0.008 (0.09) 29.87***
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 2.996 (1.04) 2.910 (1.01) 18.56***
NEW PRODUCTS 0.511 (0.50) 0.351 (0.48) 72.18***
NEW PROCEDURES 0.225 (0.42) 0.105 (0.31) 72.07***
TECHNICAL STATE 2.172 (0.72) 2.257 (0.77) −25.30***
Note: *** p<0.01
Fig. 2 Firm productivity split by WTA and non-WTA firms. Germany 2008–2013. Source: IAB
Establishment Panel
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However, during the Great Recession, WTA could not prevent a more pronounced con-
traction of productivity. An obvious decline is observed in 2009.
4 Methods and econometric results
4.1 Empirical approach
The starting point of multivariate estimates is the determination of the influence of
WTA on labor productivity in order to compare them with existing investigations. A
first problem is the selection of control variables. For the labor productivity estimation,
the specification can be based on the production theory and a wide range of well-
developed production functions. Nevertheless, the decision is unclear, and we want to
analyze further performance functions for which no clear theory exists. Therefore, we
use the least angle regression selection approach (LARS - Efron et al. 2004) to choose
variables from among available firm characteristics. Assume the productivity function
(main equation) is:
log PRODitð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1WTAit þ x′it β2 þ uit ¼: β0 þ _x′it βþ uit ‚ ð1Þ
where i = 1,…,N is the index of firms, t = 1,…,T is the index of time periods, β’ =
(β0,β’) = (β0,β1,…,βK) is the coefficient vector, and uit is the error term.
For the log productivity function (log(PROD)), the following determinants are
selected:
X ¼ ðLABOR HOARDING; FIXED−TERM EMPLOYMENT; PART−TIME WORK;
TEMPORARY WORK;OVERTIME WORK; log GRADUATESð Þ;
log SKILLED WORKERSð Þ; EXTRA PAYMENTS; DEPARTED EMPLOYEES;
LAY−OFFS; QUITS; MUTUAL DISMISSALS; RELOCATIONS;
RETIREMENTS; EARLY RETIREMENTS; log FIRM SIZEð Þ;
PLANT CLOSURE; OUTSOURCING; STARBUST; REORGANIZATION;
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE; NEW PRODUCTS; NEW PROCEDURES;
TECHNICAL STATE; log INVESTMENTSð Þ
ð2Þ
The order of the variables indicates their statistical importance. This means that the
variable LABOR HOARDING is first selected by the least angle regression as the most
important influence among the given set of establishment characteristics.
Pooled OLS estimates neglect possible unobserved establishment effects (ui). In this
case, we have uit = ui + εit, where the latter term is the classical error term. Based on the
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier approach, we can test whether the null hypothesis
that no such effects exist has to be rejected. Hausman tests allow us to ascertain
whether random or fixed effects estimates are superior. A further problem is the inter-
dependency between productivity and WTA. On the one hand, WTA may decrease or
increase the productivity, as described in Section 1. On the other hand, low productivity
may induce the adoption of working time accounts in order to improve competitiveness.
In this case, a WTA function is formulated (first-stage equation)
WTAit ¼ γ0 þ γ1 log PRODitð Þ þ z′it γ2 þ νit ¼: γ0 þ ez′it γ þ νit ð3Þ
We estimate within two-stage least squares for panel data models (W2SLS; Baltagi
2005, p.114)
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βW2SLS ¼ _X′1 P €X1 _X 1
 −1
_X′1 P €X1 _y1; V βW2SLS
  ¼ σ2ε11 _X′1 P €X1 _X 1
 −1
ð4Þ
where Ẋ = (WTA,X) are the determinants of the main structural equation (1) of our
simultaneous two equation model. €X = (X, Z) include all exogenous variables of the
complete model; σ2ε11 is the variance of the classical part of the error term in the
main equation (1). Multiplied with the weight matrix Q, the following expressions are
defined: Ẋ1 = Q Ẋ, €X1 =Q€X and ẏ1 = Qlog(PROD), where Q = INT - P. The scalar N is the
number of firms, and T the number of time periods. The matrix P is the Kronecker prod-
uct between the identity matrix IN and the matrix of ones of dimension T.
Well-founded instruments based on policy measures or institutional rules that are
not correlated with the error term are not available. Therefore, identifying variables
have to be constructed by observational information from the dataset. The average in-
dustry WTA (a_indusWTA) or the average regional (a_regWTA) variable is a possibil-
ity. The disadvantage of these indicators is that if firms never switched region or
industry, then these variables are time-invariant and would drop out of the model after
applying a within- or a first-differences estimator.
We use the classified predicted probability of WTA (prWTA_c) as an instrument.
The prWTA_c variable is determined in two steps. In the first step, probit estimates of
WTA are executed. Based on these estimates, the probability that a firm has WTA is
calculated (prWTA). In the second step, this variable is classified into 10 intervals
(prWTA_c = 1 if 0 < prWTA < =0.1, prWTA_c = 2 if 0.1 < prWTA < =0.2, …, prWTA_c
= 10 if 0.9 < prWTA < =1). The intention of these constructions is to obtain a variable
that is strongly correlated with WTA but uncorrelated with the error term of the main
equation. Tests for endogeneity, over-identifying restrictions and weak instruments –
see Appendix (Table 8), columns EXO, OIR and WI – are used to check whether the
applied identifying variables fulfill the necessary conditions. Also this instrument can
be criticized because identification comes only from the different functional form of
prWTA_c compared with WTA. Because we do not focus on causal effects, but from a
statistical view, endogeneity problems shall be solved, the argument is not so relevant.
Productivity is not the only indicator to evaluate whether WTA are beneficial for es-
tablishments. Following Addison et al. (2001), typical further performance indicators
are labor fluctuations, departures, hires, wages, innovation and profitability. We focus
on wages per employee, investments and profitability. We test whether WTA also influ-
ence investments because innovations are expressed by investments and the latter
affect productivity. Influence on firms’ costs is also relevant, especially for employee
wages. Our last step is to test a relationship between profits and WTA. If there is a sig-
nificantly positive correlation between these two indicators, we have strong evidence
that WTA are beneficial for firms. As a supplement, interaction models are estimated.
This means the WTA dummy is multiplied by specific firm’s characteristics and incor-
porated in the profit function. So we can prove whether WTA effects differ in establish-
ments with typical characteristics from others.
Finally, we investigate whether WTA effects differ between subgroups. On the one
hand, we split firms into groups with high and low sales variability, as well as firms with
a high share and a low share of skilled workers. On the other hand, based on the max-
imal agreed compensation duration of time credits and time debits, the effects are
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compared. We distinguish between the following compensation periods: compensation
period up to one year, longer than one year, no fixed compensation period. The hypoth-
eses are the following: (i) the stronger the fluctuations of the product demand, the
more a firm benefits from WTA; (ii) the lower the share of skilled workers, the more
negative profit effects can be expected; and (iii) the longer the compensation period,
the more likely is it that actual working time matches the actual demand for labor.
4.2 Econometric results for the entire sample
As establishment characteristics, we analyze the following performance variables, most
of which are measured in logarithms (log(.)): productivity, wages per employee, and in-
vestments. Finally, we are interested in the establishment’s profits measured by a cat-
egorical variable. The IAB Establishment Panel reports whether the profit situation is
very good, good, satisfactory, sufficient or poor. As an alternative, we use the operating
surplus (=sales-preliminary work-wages) as a proxy for profits.
OLS estimates—see Table 2—provide no significantly positive WTA effects on product-
ivity and weakly negative effects on profits. Wages per employee and investments increase
by WTA. Firms with WTA have a higher propensity than other firms to adopt overtime
work (Bellmann and Hübler 2015). An extension of overtime work is plausible when no
overtime premiums have to be paid within the WTA bounds. Then, there are firm advan-
tages. However, there are resulting higher costs. WTA in the log(PRODUCTIVITY) esti-
mation do not display the expected significant impact. A reason for this unexpected result
might be the neglect of the interdependency between productivity and WTA—see Section
4.1 and the outcome of Appendix (Table 8), column EXO. The difference between col-
umns (1) and (2) in Table 2 is that in the latter the export share (EXPORT) is incorpo-
rated as an additional regressor. The influence of EXPORT is significant in all five
estimates—not reported in Table 2—but the variation of WTA compared with column (1)
is negligible except in the investment function.
Table 2 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for different establishment performance functions
with a working time accounts (WTA) dummy as a regressor
(1) (2)
β(WTA) std.err β(WTA) std.err
log(PRODUCTIVITY) 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.010
log(WAGES per EMPLOYEE) 0.073*** 0.004 0.064*** 0.005
log(INVESTMENTS) 0.171*** 0.015 0.112*** 0.016
log(OPERATING SURPLUS) 0.012 0.009 0.015*** 0.009
PROFITS −0.019* 0.010 −0.023*** 0.010
Notes: PRODUCTIVITY is measured by the ratio of total business volume and total number of employees. The control variables
are LABOR HOARDING, FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT(D), PART-TIME WORK(D), TEMPORARY WORK(D), log(GRADUATES),
log(SKILLED WORKERS), log(FIRM SIZE), EXTRA PAYMENTS(D), QUITS, MUTUAL DISMISSALS, RELOCATION, RETIREMENTS,
EARLY RETIREMENTS, PLANT CLOSURE(D), OUTSOURCING(D), STARBUST(D), REORGANIZATION(D), COMPETITIVE PRESSURE,
NEW PRODUCTS(D), NEW PROCEDURES(D), TECHNICAL STATE, Y2008(D), Y2009(D), Y2010(D), Y2011(D), and Y2012(D).
Variables with D in parentheses indicate that these are dummies. PROFITS are measured by an ordinal scale: 1 – poor,
2 – sufficient, 3 - satisfactory, 4 – good, 5 – very good. Further ordinal scaled variables are COMPETITIVE PRESSURE (1 – no
pressure, 2 – minor pressure, 3 – medium pressure, 4 – substantial pressure) and TECHNICAL STATE (1 – state of the art,…, 5
- obsolete). LABOR HOARDING is assumed if the firm has answered that under the assumption of extensive demand a higher
business volume could be managed with the available personnel and plant equipment. REORGANIZATION is defined as
organizational developments that resulted from the integration of other establishments or establishment units into the com-
pany; robust standard errors. In column (2) the specification is supplemented by EXPORT, the export share;
*p < 0.1, ***p < 0.01
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As an extension of the analysis, we undertake instrumental variables panel estimates.
The hypothesis of no time-invariant establishment effects is rejected—see Appendix
(Table 8), column BP—and the fixed effects estimator is preferred—see Appendix (Table
8), column HAUS. The productivity and investment effects of WTA are significantly posi-
tive. For the productivity function, the complete estimates with and without industry and
region dummies are shown in Appendix (Table 9). In addition to the positive WTA effect,
we find that labor hoarding significantly reduces productivity, while relocations and reor-
ganizations enhance productivity. We do not find significant wage effects of WTA. Separ-
ate estimates for the output and the number of employees as a supplement to the
productivity estimation show that the positive WTA effect on productivity is driven by
the output and not by the number of employees (Bellmann and Hübler 2015).
The interpretation of the profit effect in Table 3 is not so obvious. As in the OLS es-
timates, no positive profit effects of WTA are revealed. The negative sign of the coefficient
means that profits are lower in WTA companies than in other firms. Increasing wages per
employee do not seem to be a decisive factor. The WTA effect is insignificant. However, a
rise of absolute wage costs can be responsible. E. g., in Bellmann and Hübler (2015) we
find that the number of departed workers declines when a WTA system is introduced.
Insofar, wage costs may rise. Under-investment might be a further reason. The sign of
the WTA effect on investment is positive. Higher investment costs are a consequence.
Further causes via indirect channels might be responsible for lower profits.
The WTA effect on profits may differ between specific types of companies. E. g., in
large, export-oriented establishments and in times of low product demand, the WTA
influence can deviate from that in other firms. To test this, interaction variables of
WTA and firm’s characteristics are incorporated in the profit function. The estimates
are presented in Table 4. We find that the significantly negative WTA effect on profits
is reduced but not completely eliminated compared with other firms or situations if
one of the three mentioned characteristics is observed. We should especially emphasize
that the hypothesis concerning product demand is confirmed: when product demand is
low, profits are positively influenced by WTA. This idea was mentioned in the introduc-
tion in the context of two perspectives. However, we cannot be sure that the statistical
effects are due to employee behavior on the one hand and employer behavior of the
other hand, which is essential for a clear distinction of the two perspectives.
So far, the puzzle of negative WTA effects on profits has not been completely solved.
The crude and self-reported measurement of profits may be the first reason. As an al-
ternative, we use the operating surplus (OS = sales-preliminary work-wages). In this
case, the sign is positive, but the effect is insignificant—see Table 3, line log(operating
Table 3 Fixed effects instrumental variables estimates for different establishment performance
functions with WTA as a regressor
β(WTA) std. err.
log(PRODUCTIVITY) 0.457** 0.193
log(WAGES per EMPLOYEE) 0.117 0.119
log(INVESTMENTS) 15.952*** 2.745
log(OPERATING SURPLUS) 0.110 0.261
PROFITS −3.246*** 0.960
Notes: Control variables are the same as in Table 2. The WTA variable is instrumented. The identifying variable is prWTA_c,
explained in Section 4.1; **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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surplus). This means OS does not differ statistically between WTA and NON-WTA es-
tablishments. Second, costs of WTA installation and operating costs may be responsible
for negative effects of WTA on profits. No information exists on this issue. Third, the
negotiating power of employees can be another explanation. If qualified workers are es-
pecially interested in flexible working time, they have the power to enforce WTA be-
cause they can threaten to reduce their working intensity. Establishments accept the
introduction of WTA because otherwise, the fall in productivity would be higher than
the savings of WTA costs. If the share of graduates and skilled workers is low and if
the staff has no threat potential, a company can forego WTA. The descriptive statistics
in Table 1 show that the share of graduates and skilled workers is significantly higher
in WTA than in other firms. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the employer
adopts WTA even though the share of graduates and skilled workers is low. Then, we
expect lower profits. This topic is analyzed under 4.3.
4.3 Results for subgroups – robustness or heterogeneity?
First, we test whether the results are robust or heterogeneous for specific industries
and firms. Second, we analyze whether the influences of WTA on firms’ performance
indicators vary under WTA contracts with different lengths of compensation periods
for time credits. Following section 4.2, the sample in Table 3 is split into firms with
higher and lower shares of graduates and skilled workers. No significant loss of profits
can be observed under a WTA regime when the share of qualified workers in the estab-
lishment is high—see Table 5(1a). This result does not change when operating surplus
instead of the categorical profit variable is used—see Table 5(1b). Nevertheless, so far,
the sign of all WTA effects on profits is negative. Therefore, we follow another line of
argument. Firms introduce WTA to achieve a better adaptation of working hours to
fluctuations of demand for goods in order to increase profits. In this case, firms with
stronger sales fluctuations are more interested in WTA. We test whether WTA effects
on operating surplus are more likely to be positive as sales vary more. First, we ask
whether this hypothesis can be confirmed at an industry level. Second, we investigate the
firm level. Sales fluctuations are measured by the variation coefficient (v) of log(sales). In
panel (2) of Table 5, industry results are presented. Based on industries with high and low
v, we find that in the former WTA induce positive OS effects. In industries with small
fluctuations, we observe the opposite result. This outcome is strengthened on the firm
level—see panel (3) of Table 5. The 25 percent of firms with the highest variation coeffi-
cient (v) of sales have positively significant WTA effects on operating surplus. Other firms
do not benefit from working time accounts on average.
Table 4 Fixed effects instrumental variables estimates with interaction variables – the influence of
working time accounts on profits
(1) (2) (3)
β std. err β std. err. β std. err
WTA −3.358*** 0.950 −3.489*** 1.019 −3.860*** 1.174
WTA*EXPORT_d 1.068*** 0.309
WTA*FSIZE_l 1.609*** 0.455
WTA*Y2009 1.454*** 0.417
Notes: The control variables are the same as in Table 3. EXPORT_d (=1 if the firm exports), FSIZE_l (=1 if the firm is large,
i.e. 500 or more employees) and Y2009 (=1 if the year is 2009) are dummies; ***p < 0.01
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In our next step, we investigate whether the WTA effects are robust or heteroge-
neous under WTA contracts with different lengths of compensation periods for time
credits. Information on subgroups of WTA is available only for 2008, 2010 and 2012
waves of the IAB Establishment Panel. In Table 6, the percentage of firms with WTA
but differently agreed compensation periods is presented. Three groups are distin-
guished: less than or equal to 1 year (CP < =1Y), more than 1 year (CP > 1Y) or no fixed
compensation period (noFCP). It can be seen that the share of firms with CP < =1Y is
the largest one but decreasing in recent years. The opposite tendency is observed for
firms with no fixed compensation period, however at a lower level. WTA with a longer
compensation period are less widespread, and no clear development is identifiable.
The instrumental variables estimates of Table 3 are extended by an interaction term be-
tween WTA and a subgroup indicator, measured by a dummy variable (see Table 6). In
Table 7, we present three different random (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimates, where
we restrict our analysis on productivity (PROD) and wages per employee (WpE) effects
and where we only show the WTA and the interaction coefficient. The control variables
are the same as in Table 3. Based on Hausman tests, the FE estimates should be preferred,
although the RE estimates indicate a higher degree of significance. The signs of
Table 5 Working time accounts (WTA) effects on profits and operating surplus (OS)
β_WTA std.err restriction
(1) Firms with high and low shares of graduates and skilled workers
(a) WTA effect on PROFITS
(i) −2.292 3.123 share of graduates > =0.7 or share of skilled workers > =0.7
(ii) −2.518* 1.495 share of graduates < 0.3 or share of skilled workers < 0.3
(b) WTA effect on operating surplus (OS)
(i) −0.337 0.629 share of graduates > =0.7 or share of skilled workers > =0.7
(ii) −0.592*** 0.279 share of graduates < 0.3 or share of skilled workers < 0.3
(2) Industries with large and small sales fluctuations measured by the variation coefficient (v) - WTA effects on OS
(i) 2.530 1.877 INDUSTRY =mining and quarrying (v = 0.151)
(ii) 1.979 2.945 INDUSTRY =manufacture of motor vehicles (v = 0.188)
(iii) 0.350 0.267 INDUSTRY = recreational and cultural activities (v = 0.183)
(iv) −1.591* 0.911 INDUSTRY = agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing (v = 0.102)
(v) −4.970 3.869 INDUSTRY = architecture, engineering offices (v = 0.108)
(vi) −0.421 0.449 INDUSTRY = education (v = 0.105)
(3) Firms with large and small sales fluctuations measured by v - WTA effects on OS
(i) 1.340*** 0.503 firms with the 25% largest sales fluctuations
(ii) −0.145 0.161 firms with the 75% smallest sales fluctuations
Notes: The specifications are the same as in Table 3; *p < 0.1 and ***p < 0.01
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of WTA subgroups, split by years (2008, 2010 and 2012)
2008 2010 2012
mean sd mean sd mean sd
CP < =1Y 0.594 (0.49) 0.573 (0.49) 0.551 (0.50)
CP > 1Y 0.130 (0.34) 0.142 (0.35) 0.134 (0.34)
noFCP 0.275 (0.45) 0.283 (0.45) 0.314 (0.46)
Notes: WTA – working time accounts; sd – standard deviation; CP < =1Y (=1 if compensation period within a year), CP > 1Y
(=1 if compensation period is more than 1 year), noFCP (=1 if no fixed compensation period is agreed) are dummies
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the coefficients are the same in RE and FE estimates. It should be noted that in all estima-
tions, the FE coefficients are absolutely larger than the RE coefficients in the productivity
function. The opposite is observed in the wage function. All in all, we cannot detect
strong influences of the length of the compensation period on the effects of WTA on
productivity and wages per employee.
We limit the following interpretation to the FE results. First, only one of the inter-
action variables is found to have significant effects on the wage per employee. All WTA
coefficients stay positive, as in Table 3, lines 1 and 2. The interaction variable reduces
the pure WTA influences. In all specifications of the log(PROD) function the sum of
the WTA coefficient and the coefficient of the interaction variable is larger than the
WTA coefficient in Table 3. Short compensation periods have stronger effects than lon-
ger ones. In other words, the total WTA effects on productivity decrease with the
length of compensation periods. From a first view, this does not seem plausible because
longer compensation periods mean more flexibility. Then, it is only later necessary to
balance positive credits because the compensation period has ended even though em-
ployees and the employer may prefer longer working time with the result of higher
productivity. However, as the compensation period lengthens, the incentives to work
harder decrease. In some sense, the time preference is effective. The earlier longer
working hours are compensated by leisure, the more employees try to work well with a
high intensity.
One could expect that the total WTA effect is lower if no compensation period is
agreed. This is observed in comparison with a one-year compensation period and also
but less in comparison with a longer compensation period. Therefore, the coefficient of
the interaction WTA*noFCP is surprising. However, no fixed compensation period also
includes cases of no restriction. Then, in practice, the horizon can be very long.
5 Conclusions
Economists, psychologists and sociologists have investigated the determinants of flexible
working time and their effects on both employees and companies. “Working time ac-
counts … have the potential to further boost flexibility for both employers and employees.
However, they are not widely available in all countries …” (European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2012a, p.5). Working time accounts
Table 7 Instrumental variables panel estimates with interaction variables – the influence of specific
working time accounts on productivity and wages per employee
log(PROD) log(WpE)
RE FE RE FE
WTA 1.689*** (0.332) 2.809 (2.793) 1.472*** (0.392) 1.064 (1.363)
WTA*CP < = 1Y −0.580*** (0.124) −0.605 (0.630) −0.367*** (0.098) −0.262 (0.327)
WTA 1.141*** (0.203) 2.327 (2.050) 0.646*** (0.146) 0.246 (0.169)
WTA*CP > 1Y −0.347*** (0.071) −0.455 (0.396) −0.139*** (0.028) −0.060* (0.032)
WTA 1.244*** (0.223) 2.164 (1.807) 0.703*** (0.170) 0.263 (0.197)
WTA*noFCP −0.305*** (0.065) −0.350 (0.275) −0.088*** (0.025) −0.024 (0.028)
Notes: Basic control variables are the same as those in Tables 2 and 3. Additionally, interaction variables between WTA
and the following variables are incorporated: CP < =1Y (=1 if compensation period within a year), CP > 1Y (=1 if
compensation period is more than 1 year), noFCP (=1 if no fixed compensation period is agreed) are dummies. The WTA
variable is instrumented as in Table 3; *p < 0.1, ***p < 0.01
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(WTA) have become more important in practice in recent years, but they were not the
center of empirical investigations. To date, there exist only a few studies on this issue that
use individual or firms data for this purpose.
The intention of our paper is to demonstrate that WTA influence the business pro-
cesses through different channels. To date, this has been an under-researched area.
Our empirical investigations show that the major question asks whether firms benefit
from WTA and whether WTA help to increase firm performance cannot simply be
answered by yes or no. When unobserved firm effects, WTA endogeneity, and firm
characteristics are considered, we find that WTA firms have significantly higher prod-
uctivity and investments than other firms. On average, the wages per employee are
the same. The operating surplus does not distinguish between WTA and non-WTA
firms, but profits are lower in the former firms.
These results are not valid for all subgroups of firms. Shorter compensation periods
for time credits and debits under WTA arrangements should be preferred under the
productivity perspective. The seeming contradiction that WTA increase productivity
and do not enhance wages per employee but induce lower profits can be resolved.
WTA and other costs usually hinder higher profits in the short run, except if sales are
highly volatile. In this situation, it is most beneficial for establishments to introduce
WTA.
WTA are not a panacea. If the macroeconomic demand for goods is characterized by
an economic slump as during the Great Recession in 2009, the balancing force of WTA
is not sufficient to hinder layoffs. This is only the case if fluctuations are short and fore-
seeable. Launov and Wälde (2014) also demonstrated that WTA do not necessarily re-
duce labor turnover and inhibit rising unemployment during recessions. However, in a
situation like the German one during the Great Recession when high-productive firms
had surpluses in their WTA in the beginning of the crisis and expected a demand
downturn on the product market, they were able to sustain a stronger realized demand
downturn than without WTA. For this purpose, economic policy should support the
adoption of WTA in the interest of establishments and workers. Adaption costs can be
subsidized. Such an instrument is less expensive than short-time work. Hunt (2013,
p.94) pointed out that certain regulations are necessary such as ceilings on cumulated
overtime hours to be compensated with time off and a time window for such compen-
sations. Heigh ceilings and long windows may cause problems in the case of “accidents”
such as firm insolvencies and mass layoffs. A further advantage of WTA is that em-
ployees prefer WTA more than company-level pacts because the latter are associated
with certain problems. Employers’ pledges are not always fulfilled (Hübler 2005, Bell-
mann 2014). Investments are a by-product of WTA and are not necessarily associated
with specific concessions of employees within company-level pacts.
Future research might usefully be threefold. First, the analysis needs to be supple-
mented by comparable studies with individual data. Then, we can better evaluate the
extent to which establishment results are driven by individual preferences for WTA.
Second, it would be instructive to carry out analogous empirical investigations in other
countries. Then, we can see whether the practice in some countries can be a role model
for others. Third, we need more long-run investigations. Then, we can assess whether
not only sales-varying firms but also other firms benefit from WTA in the long run
under a profit perspective.
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Appendix
Table 8 Specification tests for different establishment performance indicator functions with WTA
as a regressor
BP HAUS EXO OIR WI
log(PRODUCTIVITY) 6691*** 1068*** 71.47*** 0.04 171.34
log(WAGES per EMPLOYEE) 6481*** 697*** 372.84*** 0.29 248.12
log(INVESTMENTS) 5397*** 280*** 423.09*** 0.10 294.00
log(OPERATING SURPLUS) 15,83*** 2008*** 247.48*** 33.80*** 923.37
PROFITS 1775*** 148*** 13.89*** 0.68 180.72
Notes: We test H_0 for no time-invariant firm effects (Breusch-Pagan test - BP), no correlation between firm effects and
regressors (random vs. fixed (Hausman test – HAUS)), exogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test - EXO), no overidentifying
restrictions (OIR) und weak instruments (Stock-Yogo test - WI). Test statistics are presented in the table, where BP, HAUS, EXO
and OIR are χ2 distributed. WI displays minimum eigenvalue statistics. All test statistics in column WI indicate that
the eigenvalue is larger than the critical value at p < 0.05, that H_0 (weak instruments) has to be
rejected; ***p < 0.01
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Table 9 Log productivity - log(PROD) – fixed effects instrumental variables estimates
Regressors β
WORKING TIME ACCOUNTS 0.4572** 0.4568**
log(GRADUATES) 0.0036 0.0020
log(SKILLED WORKERS) 0.0445*** 0.0443***
log(FIRM SIZE) −0.0793*** −0.0784***
log(INVESTMENTS) 0.0148*** 0.0143***
LABOR HORDING −0.0770*** −0.0753***
FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT 0.0058 0.0048
PART-TIME WORK 0.0081 0.0111
TEMPORARY WORK −0.0017 −0.0026
OVERTIME WORK −0.0113 −0.0117
EXTRA PAYMENT −0.0005 0.0007
DEPARTED EMPLOYEES −0.0012*** −0.0012***
LAY-OFFS 0.0003 0.0004**
QUITS 0.0016*** 0.0015***
MUTUAL DISMISSALS −0.0006** −0.0005**
RELOCATIONS 0.0011*** 0.0011***
RETIREMENTS 0.0003 0.0003
EARLY RETIREMENTS 0.0013*** 0.0013***
PLANT CLOSURE −0.0764*** −0.0758***
OUTSOURCING −0.0469** −0.0483**
STARBUST −0.1770*** −0.1833***
REORGANIZATION 0.0774*** 0.0719***
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE −0.0015 −0.0014
NEW PRODUCTS 0.0044 0.0028
NEW PROCEDURE −0.0188*** −0.0176***
TECHNICAL STATUS −0.0246*** −0.0246***
Y2008 0.0346*** 0.0585***
Y2009 0.0250*** 0.0247***
Y2010 −0.0489*** −0.0490***
Y2011 −0.0053 −0.0049
Y2012 0.0137** 0.0141**
INDUSTRIES no yes
REGIONS no yes
N 47824 47824
Number of groups 2787 2787
Notes: WTA is instrumented by prWTA_c. On the right-hand side, in addition to 5 year dummies, 14 industry dummies
and 16 regional dummies (Bundesländer) are incorporated; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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